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Office of the United States Attorney
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Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee the United States of America
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Terrence Chatman was found guilty by a jury for possessing with intent to
distribute cocaine base and cocaine, for using a firearm in furtherance of these offenses,
and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the District Court found
that Chatman had three prior serious drug offenses committed on occasions different
from one another and thus qualified for the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”)
enhancement. It sentenced Chatman to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
Chatman challenges the application of the ACCA enhancement to him. For the following
reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only the necessary facts.
While on parole for unrelated state charges, Terrence Chatman lived in the basement of
his mother’s house. After his parole officer observed him driving and breaking his
curfew several times, both violations of the conditions of his parole, the officer conducted
a search of Chatman’s home. In Chatman’s room, he found unused latex gloves, a digital
scale with white powder residue, and a box of plastic bags. Hidden in the ceiling, he
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found 27.11 grams of cocaine, 21.89 grams of cocaine base, a loaded .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol, and more bags.
Based on the parole officer’s search, the United States sought and received an
indictment against Chatman. The indictment charged him with one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a); one count of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a); one count
of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 942(c)(1); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At trial, Chatman testified and admitted to possession of the drugs. However, he
contested the gun charge, claiming that it belonged to his girlfriend Kimberly Harley and
that he only possessed the gun momentarily while she placed it in the ceiling. The jury
ultimately rejected that theory and found Chatman guilty on all counts.
A pre-sentence report was prepared that detailed Chatman’s lengthy criminal
history. The report noted that on June 7, 1995, Chatman sold cocaine to an undercover
agent. On June 12, 1995, he sold cocaine to the same undercover agent. A search
warrant was executed on July 20, 1995, and the police found drug paraphernalia, two
ounces of cocaine, and cash in Chatman’s bedroom. A year later, in 1996, he pled guilty
to multiple counts of manufacturing, delivering or possessing with intent to manufacture
or deliver a controlled substance and conspiring to do the same based on this conduct (the
“1996 convictions”).
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Based only on this threadbare recitation of the facts underlying these convictions,
the probation officer determined that Chatman qualified as an armed career criminal
pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), as these convictions
were three “serious drug offenses” that were “committed on occasions different from one
another,” id. Application of the enhancement raised Chatman’s mandatory minimum
sentence to 15 years’ imprisonment and raised his maximum sentence to life
imprisonment.
In his sentencing memorandum to the District Court, Chatman’s counsel objected
to the application of the ACCA enhancement. However, his counsel withdrew the
objection at the sentencing hearing and conceded that the enhancement applied based on
Chatman’s 1996 convictions. Appendix (“App.”) at 661-62. After hearing argument
from the parties, the District Court applied the enhancement and sentenced Chatman to
300 months on the drug possession charges and for being a felon in possession of a
firearm to be served concurrently with each other, and 60 months for possessing a firearm
in furtherance of the drug crimes to be served consecutively. Thus, the District Court
sentenced Chatman to a total term of 360 months’ imprisonment. Chatman filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II.1
Because Chatman’s counsel withdrew his objection to the application of the
ACCA enhancement at sentencing, our review is for plain error. See United States v.
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005). “Under the plain error standard, before an
appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, it must find: (1) an error; (2) that is
plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” Id. at 236. “If all three conditions are met,
[we] may in [our] discretion grant relief, but only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alterations in the original).
An individual convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession
of a firearm and who has three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug
offense is subject to an enhanced sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, § 924(e)
holds:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court ... for a violent felony or serious drug
offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such
person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than
fifteen years.
Id.
In appealing the application of this enhancement, Chatman raises two distinct
arguments. First, he contends that the 1996 convictions are not three “previous
convictions” that were “committed on occasions different from one another,” and thus he
does not qualify for the enhancement. Second, he argues that the issue of the
separateness of the convictions should have been submitted to a jury to be found beyond
a reasonable doubt pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000). We address each in turn.

5

A.
The District Court did not plainly err when it applied the ACCA enhancement. In
United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 1989), we adopted the “separate
episodes” test to determine what constitutes “occasions different from one another.”
Such a finding does not turn on whether there were separate criminal proceedings. See
id. at 74. Rather, it can turn on whether the criminal episodes were “distinct in time.” Id.
at 73. In determining what constitutes “occasions different from one another,” we look
at, inter alia, whether the defendant had sufficient time to cease and desist the criminal
activity. United States v. Cardenas, 217 F.3d 491, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that two
drug sales forty-five minutes apart to the same undercover agent were separate occasions
under the ACCA).
While there may be situations that require a more nuanced factual analysis, we
have no trouble concluding based on this record that the District Court did not plainly err
in finding that the three charges constituted “occasions different from one another.”
Chatman pled guilty to selling drugs to the same undercover agent first on June 7 and
then on June 12. In those five days, he had plenty of time to decide not to continue to sell
drugs. For similar reasons, the charges stemming from the July 20 search, which
occurred more than a month after the last drug sale, arose from a separate and distinct
criminal episode. As these three convictions were for crimes committed on different
occasions, the District Court did not plainly err in finding that Chatman qualified for the
ACCA enhancement.
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B.
The District Court did not plainly err when it did not submit the facts underlying
the ACCA enhancement to the jury. We need not decide whether, under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), defendants have a constitutional right to have the “occasions
different from one another” issue decided by a jury. Even if Apprendi were implicated by
the “different occasions” inquiry, that right can be waived if a defendant stipulates to the
relevant facts. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004). Here, Chatman does
not contest the dates of his prior offense conduct; he only disputes the legal significance
of those dates. Since the dates the crimes were committed are not in dispute, all that is
left is a legal conclusion which a district court can make without a jury.
III.
Chatman also contends that the District Court plainly erred in instructing the jury
and that he should be resentenced pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. We have
carefully considered these arguments and find them to be without merit. We will affirm
the District Court’s judgment and sentence.
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